https://newsmakingnews.com

Contents:

Click. Sex tourists' to go on register

Click. J. Edgar's Hoover's dark (African American) secret is revealed

Click. Web Site Lists Iran Coup Names (New York Times article.)

Click. REDACTED NAMES FROM REPORT ABOUT CIA'S IRAN COUP. FULL COVERAGE.

Click. TONY COEHLO HAS A BRAIN CYST.

Click.  Philip Agee, "ex" spook tours Cuba

By Nicole Winfield © 2000, Associated Press Writer, Friday, June 23, 2000; 1:15 a.m. EDT

HAVANA –– Former CIA agent Philip Agee, a longtime friend of communist Cuba who exposed purported CIA operatives in his infamous book, has resurfaced in Havana, where he has launched what he says is the first independent American business in 40 years.

With European investors and the state-run travel agent as his partner, Agee has opened a travel Web site designed specifically to bring American tourists to the island – even if it means violating the U.S. trade embargo.

The site, cubalinda.com, offers package tours within Cuba and other help with Cuban tourism that is largely off limits to Americans because of U.S. law.

"I would like to see people ignore the law," Agee said at a press conference Thursday. "The idea is to disdain this law to the point that our grandfathers disdained Prohibition."

Agee has long enraged supporters of U.S. sanctions on Cuba by his support of Fidel Castro's revolution and campaign to end the nearly four-decade-old embargo, which limits American tourists from spending money on the island – effectively barring them from visiting.

He has also been accused of receiving up to $1 million in payments from the Cuban intelligence service. He has denied the accusations, which were first made by a high-ranking Cuban intelligence officer and defector in a 1992 Los Angeles Times report.

Agee, 65, quit the CIA in 1969 after 12 years with the agency, working mostly in Latin America during the years that leftist movements were gaining prominence and sympathizers.

His 1975 book "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" cited alleged CIA misdeeds against leftists in Latin America that included a 22-page list of purported agency operatives.

Barbara Bush, the wife of former president George Bush – himself a onetime CIA chief – in her autobiography accused the book of exposing a CIA station chief, Richard S. Welch, who was later killed by leftist terrorists in Athens in 1975. Agee, who denied any involvement in the death, sued her for defamation and she revised the book to settle the case.

Agee's U.S. passport was revoked in 1979. U.S. officials said he had threatened national security.

After years of living in Hamburg, Germany – occasionally underground, fearing CIA retribution – Agee has decided to make Havana his home and the seat of his new business.

American companies have been barred from doing business with Cuba since the embargo was imposed in the 1960s to put pressure on Castro.

"I don't have a license. I don't have permission. I haven't asked and I'm not going to because it's a question of principle," Agee said.

A spokesman at the U.S. Treasury Department in Washington said officials were unaware of Agee's plans and had no comment Thursday.

Agee said he received funding for the tourism project from European investors, but declined to say how much or even who they are.

"They are not especially interested in advertising the fact that they're involved with me here," Agee said, acknowledging his own infamy.

The Web site, which has been partially running since February, on Friday is to launch its first major promotion targeted at Americans – a weeklong tour during carnival festivities in July and August.

Prices start at around $600 inclusive – although not including airfare, which must be arranged separately and through a third country unless the visitor receives a Treasury Department license, he said.

The tours must be pre-paid over the Internet to a European bank account run by the company – a rare concession to U.S. law in that the money isn't directly deposited in a Cuban account.

Agee said he has received no word from the U.S. government about his dealings. But he has received threatening e-mails from people he believes are anti-Castro Cuban-American exiles in Miami, who are opposed to any dealings with Cuba.

"It's always nice to know that your enemy, or that your unfriendly side, knows that you're in business," he said.

–––

On the Net: http://www.cubalinda.com

From country edition of "San Francisco Examiner" p. A-10, 6/24/00, compiled from Examiner wire reports: 

"Coelho has brain cyst," Gore's aides report 

WASHINGTON _ Tony Coelho, former campaign chairman for Democratic presidential contender Al Gore, has a brain cyst that does not appear to be life-threatening, Gore aides said. 

Coelho cited health problems when he stepped down, and Gore campaign manager Donna Brazile said earlier this week that they had turned out to be worse than first thought."

Web Site Lists Iran Coup Names

By EDWARD WONG © 2000 New York Times 6/24/00

Web site about international security has published a list of names from a Central Intelligence Agency document that The New York Times had deleted when it originally posted the report on its own Web site. The document outlined the C.I.A.'s involvement in a 1953 coup in Iran.

The Times decided to black out about two dozen names because editors thought that publishing them might endanger the lives of those people. Almost all were Iranians and had been involved in the coup.

The Web site administrator who published the names, John Young, was able to see them on The Times's Web site when a computer programming error allowed the names to briefly flash on the screen of a slow-running computer.

After blacking out the names, The Times posted the full C.I.A. report on its site on June 11. The full-length report was published as supplemental information to an article that had run in the newspaper and on the Times Web site. The article drew on information in the full-length report to explain the C.I.A.'s involvement in the Iran coup.

On Monday, when Mr. Young told editors of The New York Times on the Web that he could see the names, they asked him not to make them public. The Times fixed the computer problem that had allowed Mr. Young to see the names, but not before he was able to release his list later that day.

"We regret that these names were published," said Bernard Gwertzman, editor of The New York Times on the Web. "It seemed unnecessary to print these names."

Mr. Gwertzman said the immediate impact of Mr. Young's publication of the names was not clear. Mr. Young could not immediately be reached by telephone for comment and did not respond to an e-mail message.

The original C.I.A. document was obtained by The Times and explained in detail a joint operation by British and American intelligence agencies to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, an elected leader with a nationalist agenda. The agencies' plan was to install Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, a pro-Western leader. The success of the coup had far-reaching consequences and helped set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979.

US 'supported anti-left terror in Italy'

Report claims Washington used a strategy of tension in the cold war to stabilise the centre-right

Philip Willan © 2000 in Rome, Saturday June 24, 2000
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,335764,00.html

The United States was accused of playing a large part in the campaign of anti-communist terrorism in Italy during the cold war, in a report released yesterday by the Left Democrat party.

The explicit accusation is contained in a draft report to a parliamentary commission on terrorism.

The formerly communist LDP is the biggest party in Giuliano Amato's centre-left government, and the report could sour relations between Italy and the United States and unleash a storm of domestic political controversy.

The 300-page report says that the United States was responsible for inspiring a "strategy of tension" in which indiscriminate bombing of the public and the threat of a rightwing coup were used to stabilise centre-right political control of the country.

Those who carried out the attacks were rarely caught, it said, because "those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence".

Valter Bielli, a Left Democrat member of parliament and one of the authors of the report, said his party's conclusions were based on recent judicial discoveries and a re-elaboration of information that had been available for many years but had not been adequately understood.

"I am convinced that the intervention of the Americans in Italy is now a historically proven fact," he said.

"They interfered to prevent the Communist party from achieving power by democratic means. The communist threat no longer exists and it would be appropriate if the Americans themselves helped us to clarify what happened in the past."

Mr Bielli said he was worried about the possible implications of the report for relations between Italy and the US, but he hoped it would contribute to the creation of a new Nato in which all countries enjoyed equal weight and dignity.

"During the cold war the east was under communist domination, but the west too had become, in a certain sense, an American colony," he said.

The report claims that US intelligence agents were informed in advance about several rightwing terrorist bombings, including the December 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan and the Piazza della Loggia bombing in Brescia five years later, but did nothing to alert the Italian authorities or to prevent the attacks from taking place.

It also alleges that Pino Rauti, a journalist and founder of the far-right Ordine Nuovo (new order) subversive organ isation, received regular funding from a press officer at the US embassy in Rome.

"So even before the 'stabilising' plans that Atlantic circles had prepared for Italy became operational through the bombings, one of the leading members of the subversive right was literally in the pay of the American embassy in Rome," the report says.

Mr Rautinow heads the small rightwing MSI Fiamma-Tricolore party, and suggestions that he and other rightwing politicians still actively involved in parliamentary politics had failed to cut their links to terrorist extremists have drawn furious rebuttals from the centre-right opposition.

The National Alliance leader, Gianfranco Fini, described the document as a "miserable report" and the centrist Republican party said it was worthy of a 1970s Maoist group.

"These are allegations that have come up over the last 20 years and there is absolutely nothing to them," a source at the US embassy in Rome said.

To Aldo Giannuli, a historian who works as a consultant to the parliamentary terrorism commission, the release of the Left Democrats' report is a manoeuvre dictated primarily by domestic political considerations.

"Since they have been in power the Left Democrats have given us very little help in gaining access to security service archives," he said.

"This is a falsely courageous report. The real issue today is gaining access to Nato's archives. There has been no impulse on this front from the government."

Millie McGhee, the author of Secrets Uncovered, J Edgar Hoover - Passing For White? is an African-American who says she was told as a little girl in McComb, Mississippi, of her family's links with Hoover.

She writes in the book that her grandfather told of her of this "very powerful" man in Washington who was related to the family but did not want the links to be known and passed himself off as white.

Ms McGhee, a former teacher in Los Angeles, explains that she contacted a genealogist in Salt Lake City, Utah, for help in tracing her family's history back 200 years.

She says her research shows that Hoover's grandfather and great-grandfather lived in a segregated black area of Washington and were classified in a census as "coloured".

Hoover, who was born in 1895 and died while still head of the FBI in 1972, was apparently anxious that no one should know of his origins.

According to Ms McGhee, relatives were warned of dire consequences if they spoke publicly of his background. As a little girl she believed that they would be killed if they mentioned the secret.

"Is this man so ashamed of his race that he would spend his whole life passing for white?" she asks. "How has our race offended him?"

She believes that his obsession with King and other black civil rights leaders stemmed in part from his repressed anger about his secret life.

She told the Guardian yesterday that members of the Hoover family who had contacted her had not been angry about the disclosures, but that her own family were unhappy with her decision to go public. "They're very upset."

"I never wanted to be related to him," she said. "I never even liked him."

Hoover came from a family that had always worked in government service in Washington. He entered the justice department after graduating in law, became acting director of the FBI in 1929 and was confirmed as director shortly afterwards.

He was associated throughout his career with a fierce paranoia about the left and the civil rights movement, and an obsession with pursuing what were seen to be enemies of the United States. A powerful figure during his life, he became the subject of much mockery after his death, when it was claimed that he had enjoyed cross-dressing.

Hoover's wire-tapping and hidden surveillance practices took the FBI's involvement in the private lives of US citizens to new levels.

After his death it was accepted that no FBI director should ever have such power again.

Ms McGhee says that the book is not an exposé of Hoover's dishonesty, but more of a cross between "Roots and Danielle Steel", in that it catalogues her search to discover the family's secrets.

Sex tourists' to go on register

BY PHILIP WEBSTER © 2000 POLITICAL EDITOR. London Times 6/24/00

BRITISH people who commit sex offences while abroad will have their names put on the national register of sex offenders under plans for a crackdown on "sex tourism" to be initiated next week by Jack Straw.

Sex offenders in Britain may also have to notify the authorities if they are planning to go abroad, so that their names can be passed on to the relevant overseas authorities.

The Home Secretary will announce on Monday that he is to review the Sex Offenders Act of 1997 that brought in the register after a spate of paedophilia cases in the early 1990s.

The legislation was proposed by the previous Conservative Government and put into effect by Labour.

Under it, convicted or cautioned sex offenders have to register their addresses with the police, whenever and wherever they move, for a period varying between five years and a lifetime. This would allow police to keep an up-to-date account of the whereabouts of a sex offender. The measures were strengthened by Labour to enable police to tell the public about sex offenders living in their areas.

According to Home Office sources the register has worked well, with 97 per cent of people who are required to register having done so. However, the provisions have not covered the cases of paedophiles who have gone to places such as Thailand and committed offences there.

The Government wants to strengthen protection against people who, while they may not have offended in Britain, could be considered a risk, particularly if they are not known to the British authorities.

The move comes as ministers put the final touches to a wide-ranging review of sex offence laws, which are due to be published before the summer.

THE CIA NAMES WHICH WERE REDACTED NAMES FROM REPORT RE: CIA'S IRAN COUP:
Cryptome: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm

Contents:

CLICK FOR CRYPTOME'S ORIGINAL ARTICLE AND UPDATES 6/24/00:

CLICK TO SEE APPENDIX D.

CRYPTOME'S ORIGINAL ARTICLE ARE REDACTED NAMES AND UPDATES:

24 June 2000: Add exchange with New York Times. Add link to second installment of the unedited report: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-ad.htm

23 June 2000: Add messages.

22 June 2000: Add messages and Cryptome response to critics.

21 June 2000: Link to first installment of the unedited report: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-07.htm

21 June 2000: Add messages.

21 June 2000

On June 16, 2000, the New York Times published on its Web site PDF files of a secret CIA report: "CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY, OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN, November 1952-August 1953," an operation planned and executed by the CIA and British SIS:

http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html

The Times wrote in an introductory note that names of participants in the overthrow were digitally edited from the report "after consultations with historians who believed there might be serious risk that the families of some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran."

Cryptome discovered during reading the report that edited portions could be read by freezing the page during loading just before the digital overwrite occurred (this was possible on a slow computer but not a fast one). We notified the Times of this and another method was used to conceal the edited material. The Times urged Cryptome not to reveal the information and we said we would not (see messages below).

Since then Cryptome has learned from messages on Intelligence Forum and other mail lists that other persons have been able to read material edited from the report. Now that the edited information has become public Cryptome is publishing the full unedited report to make it more widely available, in particular to those named in it until now known by a few hostage holding "historians."

Here are messages on the topic:

From: Jerry Ennis 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New York Times
Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2000 17:21:26 -0400

Readers may recall that, in April, the New York Times published
portions of the CIA's Clandestine Service History report on the 1953
overthrow of Iran's Premier Mossadeq. Today, the New York Times has
now published the complete report with very minor deletions (made by
NYT editors).

The report starts at

http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-intro.pdf

Note that the report's table of contents appears on page 4 of this
file and the table of contents is linked to each section of the
report. Links to all sections are also posted at the end of each pdf
file at the NYT site.


*****************************************************

From: Jerry Ennis ([email protected])

Intelligence Forum (http://www.intelforum.org) is sponsored by Intelligence
and National Security, a Frank Cass journal (http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/ins.htm)


Intelligence Forum (http://www.intelforum.org) is sponsored by Intelligence
and National Security, a Frank Cass journal (http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/ins.htm)

Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 08:19:45 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: Re: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New
  York Times

The digital means the NY Times used to black out names
of persons it was advised might be put at risk by publication
failed to do the job properly. All the deletions are readle.
The unredacted report shall be published shortly on 
cryptome.org. 

The unexpected consequences of digital security are worth 
pondering.

Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 08:49:57 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: Re: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New  York Times
To: [email protected]

        Are you really this cavalier with other people's lives?

> The digital means the NY Times used to black out names
> of persons it was advised might be put at risk by publication
> failed to do the job properly. All the deletions are reable.
> The unredacted report shall be published shortly on 
> cryptome.org. 
> 
> The unexpected consequences of digital security are worth 
> pondering.
 

Date: 19 June 2000

Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 23:13:10 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: The NYT CIA Report

We read the CIA report on the overthrow of Mossadeq from
the New York Times site on a slow computer. When page 54 
loaded we saw a block of text an instant before it was blacked 
out. We backed up and loaded it again, with the same result: 
a flash of the redacted text. 

We then commenced successive reloading the page and 
interrupting loading a split second before the text was blacked 
out. After a few tries we were able to freeze loading so that the text 
was perfectly readable: a list of some two dozen names of alleged
participants in the overthrow.

We then used the method on other redactions with the same
result that all the redacted text in the report and its appendices
was readable.

We tried the method on fast computers and found the pages
loaded too fast to see the flash of text and too fast for us to interrupt
the loading before blackout occurred.

A curious breach that would be missed by fast computers such
as the NY Times must have to process its digital files, and perhaps
the supercomps at select agencies as well.

We've sent the Times a note about it.

Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 23:26:31 -0400
From: Dave Emery 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

On Mon, Jun 19, 2000 at 11:13:10PM -0400, John Young wrote:
> We read the CIA report on the overthrow of Mossadeq from
> the New York Times site on a slow computer. When page 54 
> loaded we saw a block of text an instant before it was blacked 
> out. We backed up and loaded it again, with the same result: 
> a flash of the redacted text. 
> 
        That is extremely stupid.   The fact you saw the text means that
anyone using a html capture utility to query the site and record the
html source of the page to a file should trivially be able to remove the
redactions with an ordinary text editor or no doubt many kinds of html
specific editors.   The text of the redacted stuff must perforce be
included in the clear as plain old marked up ascii as it could not have
been momentarily displayed as something readible otherwise.

        Someone was either trying to leak material to the world
deliberately or was completely incompetant.   And I mean completely...


-- 
        Dave Emery N1PRE,  [email protected]  DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. 
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2  5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

From: "Jitze Couperus" 
To: 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 08:51:01 -0700

Dave Emery wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 19, 2000 at 11:13:10PM -0400, John Young wrote:
> > We read the CIA report on the overthrow of Mossadeq from
> > the New York Times site on a slow computer. When page 54
> > loaded we saw a block of text an instant before it was blacked
> > out. We backed up and loaded it again, with the same result:
> > a flash of the redacted text.
> >
> That is extremely stupid.   The fact you saw the text means that
> anyone using a html capture utility to query the site and record the
> html source of the page to a file should trivially be able to remove the
> redactions with an ordinary text editor or no doubt many kinds of html
> specific editors.   The text of the redacted stuff must perforce be
> included in the clear as plain old marked up ascii as it could not have
> been momentarily displayed as something readible otherwise.
>

Not quite as simple as that - the original report appears to be an
image (processed by Photoshop at some point) and (I'm guessing
here based on  what I see in the file) a subsequent snippet of postscript
to overlay sensitive spots in the image with a blodge. All of this is then
encapsulated in an Adobe PDF file. But in essence you are correct -
moderately skillfull wielding with an editor to remove the bits of script
that inserted the blodges would result in the original image being rendered
without redactions.

Slowing the rendering machine down and/or stopping it in its
tracks - after the image is displayed but before the blodges
are inserted - has the same effect and is even easier for those
with accerss to a megahertz deprived machine.

To bring this back on topic - the latter demonstrates the irony
that those deprived of the latest technology, are sometimes in a better
position to harvest information than those with the fastest Cray.

Jitze Couperus

From: Jerry Ennis 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New York Times
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 05:53:52 -0400

On Mon, 19 Jun 2000 08:19:45 -0400, John Young wrote:

>
>The unredacted report shall be published shortly on 
>cryptome.org. 
>
Just because a person can behave irresponsibly does not mean he should
behave irresponsibly.

>The unexpected consequences of digital security are worth 
>pondering.
>

Mr. Young should ponder the expected consequences of his proposed
action.


*****************************************************

From: Jerry Ennis ([email protected])

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 07:02:03 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: Re: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New
  York Times

The report tells a shameful story of murderous US policy, however
much its author and its leaker aim to crow or confess, and we don't 
want help hide that by giving a diversionary.

So we are holding up putting the unredacted material on the
Web until we hear from the NY Times on what will be done
to better secure the "threat to agents" we hear so much about
from those who threaten others as a matter of policy -- even
here.

Still, more more information about carefully manipulated 
leaks, rather redacted "history," is worth providing.

For now we will publish, as here earlier today, what can
be gleaned from the report with careful attention to what
it contains just beneath its patently transparent cloak.

Names of agents and officers inartfully concealed is from the 
payback manual, no?

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 07:12:17 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: Re: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New  York Times
To: [email protected]
 
> Names of agents and officers inartfully concealed is from the 
> payback manual, no?

        Could be an honest mistake, no?

        Alec

The Ural was getting too mainstream - so we bought the Dnepr.
**********************************************************************
*Alec Chambers ([email protected])          *My employer and I       *
*Senior Scientific Information Analyst      *speak to one another    *
*Chemical Abstracts Service                 *but we do not speak     *
*Phone: (614)-447-3600 ext. 3533            *for one another.        *
*********************************************************************.

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 11:04:29 -0400
To: John Young 
From: Rich Meislin 
Subject: Re: CIA Iran Report

Dear Mr. Young,

Thank you for informing us about the problem with this document. We 
are removing it from our site until we can delete the names in a more 
secure fashion.

The names were obscured because of our concern for possible 
retribution against the families of the people named in this report, 
and we would strongly urge you to respect that judgment.

Sincerely,
Rich Meislin

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 16:15:23 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

The NY Times has written that the CIA report is
being withdrawn until a secure method assures
that the redactions are not readable.

The paper urged us not to disclose ineptly redacted
information, to respect its decision to not publish it.

But that may be a goad to publish, huh? A redacted
page from the Pentagon Papers manual on defying
prior restraint, yes?

Date: 20 June 2000
To: Rich Meislin 
From: [email protected]
Subject: CIA Iran Report

Dear Mr. Meislin,

We shall not publish names in the CIA report. We have
not disclosed the names from p. 54 sent to you.

Thanks for making the report public.

Regards,

John Young
cryptome.org

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New York Times
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 13:03:32 -0400

For Agencies that excel in clever misinformation, lies and deception, even
to their Masters,  methinks the "leaks", together with the "tantalizing"
deletion of names, are just too convenient.

We all know the CIA was totally out of control during that period, and many
employees, and ex-employees should be doing long prison sentences, but let
the buyer beware.

Like the MI6 list, let us ask "Why", and take a good look around for what
else is going on, whilst everyone's attention is focused on the obvious.
(Same for Los Alamos, Elian etc.) I did a hour long radio talk show on
Thursday, on information security and government incompetence. Interesting
was the number of "Urgent Talking Points" Faxed for me from right wing
organizations with "Leaks" and very detailed chronology of failures under
Clinton, and other Democratic Presidents. Also interesting were the number
of "call-ins" with details of embarrassing anecdotes.

We know there is a Regime of Arrogance, and disdain for democratic process
and oversight, in these government agencies, but let us not blindly accept,
and distribute every "leaked document" we have presented. Clean up the
dirty, smelly bathwater problem, but save the Baby!

Alan Simpson
[email protected]

> The report tells a shameful story of murderous US policy, however
> much its author and its leaker aim to crow or confess, and we don't
> want help hide that by giving a diversionary.
>
> So we are holding up putting the unredacted material on the
> Web until we hear from the NY Times on what will be done
> to better secure the "threat to agents" we hear so much about
> from those who threaten others as a matter of policy -- even
> here.
>
> Still, more more information about carefully manipulated
> leaks, rather redacted "history," is worth providing.
>

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 13:27:07 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: RE: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New York Times
To: [email protected]

>For Agencies that excel in clever misinformation, lies and deception, 
>even to their Masters,  methinks the "leaks", together with the 
>"tantalizing" deletion of names, are just too convenient.


        You do, of course, realize that in trying not to fall prey to a 
CIA disinformation plot, that you have lengthened the life of the real 
disinformation operation. 
        
        Alec

The Ural was getting too mainstream - so we bought the Dnepr.
**********************************************************************
*Alec Chambers ([email protected])          *My employer and I       *
*Senior Scientific Information Analyst      *speak to one another    *
*Chemical Abstracts Service                 *but we do not speak     *
*Phone: (614)-447-3600 ext. 3533            *for one another.        *
*********************************************************************.

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 12:34:24 -0500
To: [email protected]
From: "Anthony D' Amato" 
Subject: RE: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New
  York Times

At 01:03 PM 6/20/00 -0400, Alan Simpson wrote:

>I did a hour long radio talk show on
>Thursday, on information security and government incompetence. Interesting
>was the number of "Urgent Talking Points" Faxed for me from right wing
>organizations with "Leaks" and very detailed chronology of failures under
>Clinton, and other Democratic Presidents. Also interesting were the number
>of "call-ins" with details of embarrassing anecdotes.
>
>We know there is a Regime of Arrogance, and disdain for democratic process
>and oversight, in these government agencies, but let us not blindly accept,
>and distribute every "leaked document" we have presented. Clean up the
>dirty, smelly bathwater problem, but save the Baby!

--------------

QUERY:  I'm unclear what point Alan is making.  If he is suggesting that
the right-wing organizations are criticizing intelligence failures under
Democratic Presidents, surely they are smart enough to know that by
the same token they have to accept intelligence failures under Republican
Presidents, and therefore their criticisms tend to cast doubt upon the
entire intelligence apparatus.  Yet I thought (perhaps mistakenly) that
it's the right wing, rather than the left wing, that generally supports
a strong intelligence-security program for government (even as they
downsize the government in other areas).  

----- 
Anthony D'Amato
Leighton Professor of Law
Northwestern University
("Life isn't everything."  -- Neil Simon)

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: Complete CIA history of 1953 Iranian coup posted by New York Times
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 15:27:47 -0400

Yes, Prof. D'Amato you are generally correct. About 2-3 years ago we noticed
a shift in persuasive tactics by right wing pressure groups. You don't
really notice these patterns, until you adopt computer technologies to
concentrate news feeds, "Talking Points", opinion statements, and all the BS
that comes into a news operation. We had a problem, akin to the whole
intelligence process, of information overload. (Keep in mind we develop news
networks, so do not have the luxury of a huge staff or armies of interns.)

No, fortunately, most vocal groups are not smart enough. They adopt
emotional "Hot Buttons" and usually by constant repetition, by multiple
channels, try and influence public opinion. (If you stop, dissect, and
analyze, huge flaws appear.) Many dream of the return to the Reagan days,
and desperately need an enemy to HATE, be it Cuba, North Korea or Socialized
Medicine!

Being objective, the right wing propaganda looks amateurish, like Moscow
Radio in the 1960's and '70's. By comparison the flood of material I get
from the from the White House, has the hallmarks of Dick Morris, Hollywood
and Madison Avenue. Full of lies, but well presented for the masses! Most of
the voting audience don't remember Lenin, Marx or know, or care what a
neo-Marxist is.

Finally Prof. D'Amato,how would you find the proposed legislation,
restrictions on cryptography, and expansion of eavesdropping and
intelligence gathering on Joe Public, under Clinton, and in the UK under
Blair, both socialist dreamers? If Reagan had proposed these measures the
loony left would have been demonstrating on the streets!

Alan Simpson
[email protected]

> QUERY:  I'm unclear what point Alan is making.  If he is suggesting that
> the right-wing organizations are criticizing intelligence failures under
> Democratic Presidents, surely they are smart enough to know that by
> the same token they have to accept intelligence failures under Republican
> Presidents, and therefore their criticisms tend to cast doubt upon the
> entire intelligence apparatus.  Yet I thought (perhaps mistakenly) that
> it's the right wing, rather than the left wing, that generally supports
> a strong intelligence-security program for government (even as they
> downsize the government in other areas).
>

From: "Allen Thomson" 
To: 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 15:46:09 -0500

John Young wrote

> The NY Times has written that the CIA report is
> being withdrawn until a secure method assures
> that the redactions are not readable.
>
> The paper urged us not to disclose ineptly redacted
> information, to respect its decision to not publish it.

Way too late, whatever was in there is out there.  That the NYT
screwed up this badly is yet another indication that "time and chance
happeneth to them all."

> But that may be a goad to publish, huh? A redacted
> page from the Pentagon Papers manual on defying
> prior restraint, yes?

I do find this too much.  Whatever you might think of the CIA or the US,
quite possibly there are names in the document that would identify people
who were working in good faith, trying to do good for their country.
Perhaps
they were mistaken, perhaps they were gulled into working for monsters
(though I don't think so), but they and theirs deserve protection.

And, given the current regime in Iran, protection is in order.

Probably some names can be justly named -- but I'd err on the side
of caution, lest past deeds beget present evil and innocents suffer.

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 16:08:53 -0500
To: [email protected]
From: "Anthony D' Amato" 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

At 03:46 PM 6/20/00 -0500, Allen Thomson wrote:

>I do find this too much.  Whatever you might think of the CIA or the US,
>quite possibly there are names in the document that would identify people
>who were working in good faith, trying to do good for their country.
>Perhaps they were mistaken, perhaps they were gulled into working for monsters
>(though I don't think so), but they and theirs deserve protection.
>
>And, given the current regime in Iran, protection is in order.
>
>Probably some names can be justly named -- but I'd err on the side
>of caution, lest past deeds beget present evil and innocents suffer.

------------

QUESTION:  I'd like to ask Allen and others whether they feel that
intelligence agents generally are lulled into a false sense of security
when their government says that their names will be protected from
disclosure.  One instance of disclosure is the Philby-Burges-Maclean-
Blunt-Klugmann infiltrations.  Another is decrypts.  Then there are
mistakes in document handling.  Missing tapes, computers.  Missent
files.  Does anyone who works for the CIA really believe that
his family name will be protected?

-----------


Anthony D'Amato
Leighton Professor of Law
Northwestern University
("Life isn't everything."  -- Neil Simon)

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 18:08:26 -0400

Allen Thomson has a point.

Whilst I am a firm believer in media influencing overall policy, and holding
the Chiefs responsible for the running of their departments, what is to be
achieved by naming the Worker Bees?

I find the dribble given to John Young by NYT amazing. You either publish,
or don't. If you don't want page 3 to go out, rip it out, electronically
delete it, or editorialize the document. There is no extra points for
showing a picture of the original. Few readers (viewers) know to look for,
and as a classified document can take many forms, then why bother.


Alan Simpson
[email protected]


> I do find this too much.  Whatever you might think of the CIA or the US,
> quite possibly there are names in the document that would identify people
> who were working in good faith, trying to do good for their country.
> Perhaps they were mistaken, perhaps they were gulled into working for
monsters
> (though I don't think so), but they and theirs deserve protection.

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 16:46:27 -0500
To: [email protected]
From: "Anthony D' Amato" 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

At 04:15 PM 6/20/00 -0400, John Young wrote:
>The NY Times has written that the CIA report is
>being withdrawn until a secure method assures
>that the redactions are not readable.
>
>The paper urged us not to disclose ineptly redacted
>information, to respect its decision to not publish it.


-----------

REQUEST:  John, I and perhaps others would
appreciate it if you would provide us with a 
copy of the letter or email that you received from
the NY Times.

------ 
Anthony D'Amato
Leighton Professor of Law
Northwestern University
("Life isn't everything."  -- Neil Simon)

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 19:20:33 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

This it the NY Times letter:

Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 11:04:29 -0400
To: John Young 
From: Rich Meislin 
Subject: Re: CIA Iran Report

Dear Mr. Young,

Thank you for informing us about the problem with this document. We 
are removing it from our site until we can delete the names in a more 
secure fashion.

The names were obscured because of our concern for possible 
retribution against the families of the people named in this report, 
and we would strongly urge you to respect that judgment.

Sincerely,
Rich Meislin

-----

I have confirmed that the Times has redacted the CIA report
by another method which appears to be secure -- at least
from me.

I have written Mr. Meislin that we will not publish the redacted
parts.

It would be appreciated if nobody thinks we have become
responsible, or worse, a "responsible publisher" -- ugh, what
dreadful complicity has accrued to that moniker, nearly as
bad as an "unnamed administration official, " or, as in
this instance, [blank] [blank] major principal Tehran station 
assets which must not be revealed to SIS, instead feed
them [blank] and sub-agent [blank].

From: [email protected]
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 18:20:59 EDT
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

In a message dated 6/20/00 4:54:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
[email protected] writes:

>

Independent of whatever I may or may not think of the CIA's role in the 
overthrow of Mossadegh, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Thompson.  Being a 
long-time admirer of Henning von Tresckow, I understand that sometimes 
patriotism is not easy to define, and I think it best to err on the side of 
mercy.  (I also have NOT read the report.)  Whatever their motives, however, 
those who loved them did not commit their acts, and should not suffer for 
them.

Erin Solaro

Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 11:05:15 +0200 (METDST)
From: Frode Weierud 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report

On Tue, 20 Jun 2000, Anthony D' Amato wrote:

> QUESTION:  I'd like to ask Allen and others whether they feel that
> intelligence agents generally are lulled into a false sense of security
> when their government says that their names will be protected from
> disclosure.  One instance of disclosure is the Philby-Burges-Maclean-

Professor D'Amato say "their government" which seems to suggest that he
thinks the names that have been redacted are Americans working for the
CIA. This is not the case. The names are those of Iranians apart from one
other foreign national.

I am all for an open society where there is as little secrecy as possible
and I have always been striving for historical material to be released in
full. However, I would never go as far as putting peoples lives at risk
and I feel that in this case is it would be prudent NOT to release the
redacted names.

Frode Weierud

        Frode Weierud           Phone  : +41 22 7674794
        CERN, SL,               Fax    : +41 22 7679185
        CH-1211 Geneva 23,      E-mail : [email protected]
        Switzerland             WWW    : http://home.cern.ch/frode/

Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 06:34:14 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

What the papers say...

This is what the Tehran Times Web edition says about the report.

Book on CIA Intervention in Iran's 1953 Coup on Internet

TEHRAN TIMES POLITICAL DESK

        TEHRAN The full text of a book revealing CIA's
interception in August 17, 1953 coup in Iran against the government of
then prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq appeared on the Internet.

        New York Times Institute on Sunday placed the
full text of the book by Donald Wilber elaborating on details of the
coup against the government of Mosaddeq on the Internet with all its
appendixes.

        The introduction and some appendixes of the
book had been placed on the Internet in April.  The editor in the
introduction noted that with the consultations made by some historians,
the names of some persons have been deleted because there was
possibility of being subjected to prosecution in Iran on charges of
serving as the agents of foreigners.

        The editor also pointed out that there is
inconsistency between the summarized introduction and the full text of
the book and the New York Times in its report has used the text of the
book as criteria.

Date: 21 June 2000

[Messages received since posting this file]

Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 10:11:01 -0500
From: Chris Moseng 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Redacted PDF

If you ever suspect you have encountered a PDF redacted in this manner
in the future, head to Kinko's.

All Kinko's rental computers with the most recent software have an
acrobat plugin called "Pitstop" that can manipulate PDFs *almost as if
they were native files.

This would include moving layers of graphics that cover text below, for
instance.

Obviously this method of redaction would only be implemented by someone
unfamiliar with the way postscript and PDF files are created and
represented.

Chris Moseng

Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 14:15:31 -0400
From: John Markoff 
To: [email protected]
Subject: iran

I am the New York Times reporter who wrote about the CIA's secret
history on Iran. We redacted names in our copy on the web at the urging
of  historians and Iranian scholars who warned that families of  Iranian
agents of the CIA may face retribution in Iran.If you go ahead with your
plans to publish the unredacted version with names, you should recognize
that you will then be responsible for whatever happens to the families
of those people in Iran.
Please call me 202-862-0355
Jim Risen

Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 14:42:53 -0400
From: John Markoff 
To: [email protected]
Subject: iran

Please respond to my last message. I think if you go ahead with your
plans to circulate an unredacted version of the Iran document, you must
recognize that you are endangering lives, and must take responsibility
for that.
Jim Risen
[email protected]
202-862-0355

From: [email protected]

From: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 20:36:03 EDT
Subject: Re: Iran document
To: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]

> Subj:  Re: Iran document
>  Date:    6/21/00 6:48:38 PM Central Daylight Time
>  From:    [email protected] (Jim Risen)
>  To:  [email protected]
>  
>  You don't seem to understand the problem. It was at the urging of
>  independent Iranian experts who are familiar with conditions in Iran today
>  that we removed the names. Our only aim was to protect people who may face
>  retribution. If your organization publishes this, you  then must accept
>  responsibility for the harm that may come to people as a result.

You are the one who doesn't understand this simple fact: I don't feel you have
any credibility on this issue. Please tell me who these "independent Iranian
experts" are so that I can contact them and they may be placed on the record.

How do you know they are as "independent" as you claim? Who are they?

From: Jerry Ennis 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 15:27:24 -0400

On Wed, 21 Jun 2000 07:03:55 -0400, long on time, short on sense
wrote:

>
>Mail list messages on the Internet show that others have 
>recovered redactions from the original NY Times PDF files.
>
>Since the information is now public we are preparing
>to publish the report unredacted.
>
Good grief, yes. There might be somebody out there somewhere who won't
get information they don't need if Mr. Young doesn't hurry.


*****************************************************

From: Jerry Ennis ([email protected])

From: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2000 17:48:27 EDT
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

In a message dated 6/21/00 7:06:25 AM Eastern Daylight Time, John Young 
writes:

>

You should be ashamed of yourself.  You are helping place other people's 
lives at risk for no good reason.  There was a reason that report was meant 
to have been redacted, and it does not matter that other people are 
publishing those names.

Erin Solaro

From: [email protected]
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 00:57:31 EDT
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

In a message dated 06/20/2000 5:49:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
[email protected] writes:

>

Prof. D'Amato     My answer is "YES".    Now let me ask you a question. What 
effect do you think your publicly stated question might have on the morale of 
newly recruited young Americans who have signed on to do a very difficult and 
dangerous job to help strenghten  our national security ?

Mike Levin

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 01:22:18 -0400

I must be mistaken. I thought this was requested email list of just over a
hundred. Did Prof. D'Amato ask his question on CNN, BBC, VOA, or is
Intelforum required monitoring for all young recruits.

My point: Let's have some realism here. If Prof. D'Amatos' question to this
small group affects moral of new CIA recruits in the field, and on
operations, we have a SERIOUS problem.

Alan Simpson
[email protected]

>   Now let me ask you a question. What effect do you think your publicly
stated question might >have on the morale of newly recruited young Americans
who have signed on to do a very
> difficult and dangerous job to help strenghten  our national security ?
>
> Mike Levin

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 06:30:28 -0400

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 07:45:25 -0500

From: Jerry Ennis 
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 11:07:26 -0400

On Thu, 22 Jun 2000 06:30:28 -0400, John Young pontificated, in part:
>
>The New York Times is commended for making the report
>available. It is a grim reminder of what harm intelligence agencies
>can cause, how the best and brightest of many countries for two 
>generations have deluded themselves and us about their prowess 
>to covertly shape political affairs -- and not least put unwary, trusting
>people -- officers and civilians -- at great risk, even death, for 
>ideological madness.

He writes, ignoring the facts that:

There was opposition, albeit disorganized, to Mossadeq within the
Iranian military;
At least one Iranian general officer had contacted the US Embassy and
asked if the US was interested in supporting an Iranian military
effort to oust Mossadeq;
These were not the actions by rogue intelligence agencies, but the
considered actions of the Governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom with the full approval of US State Department and
President of the United States as well as the UK Foreign Office and
Prime Minister, and -- perhaps most importantly;
While decrying TPAJAX actions for putting "unwary, trusting
people -- officers and civilians -- at great risk, even death, for 
ideological madness," Mr. Young chooses to do the same.

>
>There must be no limitation on getting these kinds of reports out,
>unedited, to alert likely victims -- officers and civilians -- of what
>threat is posed by covert, secret operations driven by vainglory
>and narrow, ambitious interests.
>
(Satirical observations follow)
I am so glad that my life has been made simpler. No longer must I
bother to weigh the opinions of such unworthies as an investigative
reporter with long experience in intelligence matters, or the
editorial staff of the newspaper that probably has the longest record
of publishing intelligence exposes, or of historians, or persons with
knowledge and experience in the fields of intelligence or foreign
affairs, or anybody else, for I am blessed to have the benefit of the
wisdom of the Great Architect, who alone knows, passes on, and rushes
to spread, the True answers to such questions of right and wrong, what
should and should not have been done almost fifty years ago, etc.,
etc., etc.
(Satirical observations end)

>That the Times failed to use adequate security for the report, that
>the edited information was easily available to those who are
>highly skilled at detecting such weaknesses, is remarkable.

The Times' decisions concerning the use of PDF files in deleting
portions of a document were mistakes made out of ignorance. Mr.
Young's decisions were not made out of ignorance, but something which
can be even more destructive.
Mr. Young also makes the mistake of concluding that, since some people
know about the problem associated with PDF files (although he
apparently stumbled across the problem rather than discovering it
through any great skill or knowledge), there is no reason he shouldn't
serve it all up to everybody on a silver platter.

>And the hoary charge that disclosure of sensitive information
>will put lives at risk -- no informed person can believe that

>CYA spin after two generations of its being used to hide
>incompetence and vanity, being used to divert attention
>from revelation of far worse deeds already executed and
>more being planned and implemented. That point was
>made in the Times reporting itself.

There he goes again. But I hope he is right on at least one point --
that no harm will come from his vanity.

>The CIA report should be read carefully and widely, as the
>Times intended, and we're grateful for being able to call
>attention to its full impact -- especially the lives already 
>long ruined by TPAJAX and those shameful operations
>which followed it, and surely will still follow, that horrifying 
>US sacrifice of Iranians who were deceived.
>
Skipping over the polemic, the report should have been read by more
people earlier. The author of the report, Dr. Donald Wilber, has
observed, "If this history had been read by the planners of the Bay of
Pigs, there would have been no such operation."

>Reread the paragraph where the CIA was planning to bug
>out of the danger it had precipitated in Iran . . .

Of course, the CIA would be being berated for abandoning these
"unwary, trusting people" if they had not planned to evacuate people
(including Iranians) in view of the possible failure of the operation.

>As now, if current campaigns for intelligence recruiting -- and 
>retention of jaded disbelievers -- are telling the truth.
>
I have no idea what this sentence is trying to say, but any reader of
Dr. Wilber's paper can draw all the "warning" conclusions that Mr.
Young seems to be trying to make without knowing whether it was Major
"X" or LtCol "Y" of the "XYZ" Battalion who was involved in the
operation. The bottom line -- and Mr. Young's reasoned response would
be welcomed -- is that disseminating the report with all names intact
contributes absolutely nothing to answering the question of whether
such operations should be undertaken under certain circumstance or
never at all. Even if you buy all of Mr. Young's tub-thumping, the
fact remains that his actions have not contributed to the
understanding of government decisions and actions in the foreign
affairs arena. The New York Times has performed a worthwhile service.
Mr. Young has not.

*****************************************************

From: Jerry Ennis ([email protected])

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 11:46:21 -0400

In attacking the messenger i.e. Herald Young, we have forgotten to ask the
fundamental question:

"should an organization, tasked with gathering and analyzing information for
the benefit of civilian and military leadership, have been involved in
creating, and manipulating events, regimes, and military matters, instead of
doing what it was created to do, report on them?"

I am sorry list, I believe civilian intelligence agencies, out of uniform,
should watch, listen, analyze and report back to their masters. Those in
uniform, with guns, bombs, tanks and big gray ships, should start wars, kill
enemies of the state, and generally go round the world creating havoc.

Taking this a step further: "As in any criminal trial, when the evidence
comes out in open court, accomplices named and events portrayed, may cause
problems for the rest of the gang!"

Moral of the story: "If you rob Banks for a living, don't expect the Nobel
Prize, when you retire, and know the "60 Minutes" TV crew isn't at your door
asking about your Geraniums."

Alan Simpson
[email protected]

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 08:27:23 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

        Tell me John, have you considered that your action is going to 
make it easier for intelligence agencies to justify not releasing 
documents?

        Alec

The Ural was getting too mainstream - so we bought the Dnepr.
**********************************************************************
*Alec Chambers ([email protected])          *My employer and I       *
*Senior Scientific Information Analyst      *speak to one another    *
*Chemical Abstracts Service                 *but we do not speak     *
*Phone: (614)-447-3600 ext. 3533            *for one another.        *
*********************************************************************.

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 12:58:11 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: John Young 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report

Alec,

I'm very new at handling sensitive documents, and am getting
a Berlitz immersion in what I should or should not believe about
them. Does anyone have access to absolute truth about the
cult of intelligence -- who was it that aptly named the perfervor
of the modern era?

My faith is uncertain so I'm recruitable, like, as Dr. Wilber hymned:
"The station principal agent team of [Djalili and Keyvani] working 
on their own and with singular shrewdness." This daring duo
going to get a movie made about them, now they're infamous.

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 13:20:05 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

> From: John Young 
> 
> Alec,
> 
> I'm very new at handling sensitive documents, and am getting
> a Berlitz immersion in what I should or should not believe about
> them. Does anyone have access to absolute truth about the
> cult of intelligence -- who was it that aptly named the perfervor
> of the modern era?

        Do you automatically broadcast everything (in public and private 
life) that you are told in confidence? If not, why not? The answer should 
either tell you how you to deal with a sensitive documents or why you don't 
have any friends.

        Alec

The Ural was getting too mainstream - so we bought the Dnepr.
**********************************************************************
*Alec Chambers ([email protected])          *My employer and I       *
*Senior Scientific Information Analyst      *speak to one another    *
*Chemical Abstracts Service                 *but we do not speak     *
*Phone: (614)-447-3600 ext. 3533            *for one another.        *
*********************************************************************.

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 13:22:49 -0400

Depends what you mean by "sensitive". My first encounter years ago, after
asking a senior officer "Why is that classified Secret"  was "Because it
makes us look like stupid fools if it ever became public."

The second encounter, minutes later was explained as, "Because it refers to
something, that refers to something in that Top Secret file."

My comment on "Why bother" was met with a firm scolding, and how the entire
Empire depended on a cloak of secrecy, to cover incompetence, and show
everyone how important we all were in the nature of the universe, handling
such classified material.

You see why I like Robert Steele's "Open Source" concept.

Alan Simpson
[email protected]

> I'm very new at handling sensitive documents, and am getting
> a Berlitz immersion in what I should or should not believe about
> them. Does anyone have access to absolute truth about the
> cult of intelligence -- who was it that aptly named the perfervor
> of the modern era?
>
> My faith is uncertain so I'm recruitable, like, as Dr. Wilber hymned:
> "The station principal agent team of [Djalili and Keyvani] working
> on their own and with singular shrewdness." This daring duo
> going to get a movie made about them, now they're infamous.

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 13:29:49 -0400 (DST)
From: John Chambers 
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report
To: [email protected]

        This tells us about inappropriate classification, and there is a lot 
of that, but it also avoids dealing with the point at hand.
        
        Should the names of those Iranian nationals who played a secret role 
in the overthrow of Mossadegh be published? That is the question.
        
        Given that there is no statute of limitations on espionage in the 
US, should the Russians be publishing the names of hitherto unidentified, 
and still living sources in the US and Britain? Should the CIA reciprocate? 

> Depends what you mean by "sensitive". My first encounter years ago, after
> asking a senior officer "Why is that classified Secret"  was "Because it
> makes us look like stupid fools if it ever became public."
> 
> The second encounter, minutes later was explained as, "Because it refers 
to
> something, that refers to something in that Top Secret file."
> 
> My comment on "Why bother" was met with a firm scolding, and how the 
entire
> Empire depended on a cloak of secrecy, to cover incompetence, and show
> everyone how important we all were in the nature of the universe, handling
> such classified material.
> 
> You see why I like Robert Steele's "Open Source" concept.

        Alec

The Ural was getting too mainstream - so we bought the Dnepr.
**********************************************************************
*Alec Chambers ([email protected])          *My employer and I       *
*Senior Scientific Information Analyst      *speak to one another    *
*Chemical Abstracts Service                 *but we do not speak     *
*Phone: (614)-447-3600 ext. 3533            *for one another.        *
*********************************************************************.

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 19:53:31 -0500
To: [email protected]
From: Michael Dravis 
Subject: Covert Action and the CIA

Mr. Simpson wrote:

>In attacking the messenger i.e. Herald Young, we have forgotten to ask the
>fundamental question:
>
>"should an organization, tasked with gathering and analyzing information for
>the benefit of civilian and military leadership, have been involved in
>creating, and manipulating events, regimes, and military matters, instead of
>doing what it was created to do, report on them?"

My own research, and the research of others, on the pre- and early history
of the CIA convinces me that it was intended, from the very beginning, to
perform espionage and what came to be called covert action.

As the wartime OSS (Office of Strategic Services, dissolved October 1945)
became the SSU (Strategic Services Unit, housed within the War Department),
then the nominally independent CIG (Central Intelligence Group, created in
January 1946) and then the more independent CIA (created September 1947), a
small cadre of key covert operations personnel were nested within each
successive organization.

This nucleus staff for covert operations was allegedly retained to study
foreign subversion techniques and for possible remobilization during
wartime.  But if the covert operations staff was intended to remain in a
passive mode, why did intelligence personnel and Cabinet officers work so
long and hard to ensure that Central Intelligence had sources of funding
that were screened from Congressional scrutiny and from the regular
budgetary procedures of the Executive Branch?

You don't need secret funding to study foreign developments or to write up
National Intelligence Estimates (or "OREs" as they were called in the early
days).  You need secret funding when you want to run agents to steal
secrets, when you want to pay foreign newspapers to publish anti-communist
editorials, and when you want to have the capability to secretly
"manipulate events."

In short, removing covert operations from the purview of Central
Intelligence may be a good idea or it may be a bad idea, but such a reform
would, I believe, be inconsistent with the vision of the CIA's founding
fathers (as far as I'm aware they were all men, so I can use that
politically incorrect term).

Sincerely,

Mike Dravis

From: "Alan Simpson" 
To: 
Subject: RE: Covert Action and the CIA
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 22:02:25 -0400

Good point. So when did the "nice guys" politically correct label appear?

And when did "Covert Action" include the sort of activities in Laos and
Vietnam? I have no problem with, as you say, an intelligence agency
stealing, robbing, wiretapping, forging and generally doing whatever it
takes to get information. Covert action, yes. Running Dictatorships, murder,
torture and bombing, with all the ensuing slaughter, no.

Consider this: If someone sent in a posting to the new moderator, explaining
how to kill political opponents, and the best ways to torture young women
and children, I think you would send it back as "Not Intelligence Related".

Maybe we have grown up a little since the 200th Anniversary, and maybe JYA
is the "politically correct" path in the New World Order.

Have to go, I have two "Little Old Ladies" with 12 gauge pump shotguns
outside, want to have a word with me!

Alan Simpson

>
> My own research, and the research of others, on the pre- and early history
> of the CIA convinces me that it was intended, from the very beginning, to
> perform espionage and what came to be called covert action.

Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 22:34:06 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: [email protected] (Q)
Subject: RE: The NYT CIA Report

John,

You're just doing fine, or if you will, you're just living up to the 
expectations of those who've intended - with certain predictability that 
you would react as you did - to invoke your actions. Really 
-you- have nothing to worry about.  For those who have, there may be a 
different reason. The future holds less secrets than the past.

cheers

Jack

Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 10:12:31 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: Steven Aftergood 
Subject: Targeting O'Leary;  Iran leaks

Years after she departed from government service, former Energy Secretary 
Hazel O'Leary remains a popular target of criticism among politicians and 
commentators of a certain ideological bent.  She was singled out several 
times at the Wednesday, June 21 hearing of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the latest security failures at Los Alamos Laboratory.

Senator James Inhofe specifically accused O'Leary of having leaked 
classified information about the W87 nuclear warhead to U.S. News and World 
Report, which published a cartoon of the W87 in its July 31, 1995 
issue.  (The same cartoon was republished in the 1999 Report of the Cox 
Committee on Chinese espionage.)  This accusation, which originated with 
Rep. Curt Weldon in the House last year, has been fully discredited.

In a letter to Senator Inhofe yesterday, the Federation of American 
Scientists asked him to publicly retract his comments and to apologize to 
Secretary O'Leary.  In a separate letter to Senate Armed Services Committee 
Chairman John Warner, FAS asked him to strike Inhofe's accusation from the 
record of the hearing, or to annotate it as false.

The FAS letters to Senators Inhofe and Warner may be found here:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/06/inhofe.html

Last Sunday, the New York Times web site published nearly the entire text 
of a classified Central Intelligence Agency history of the 1953 covert 
action in Iran.  The secret CIA history had been leaked to the Times 
earlier in the year, and first reported on April 16.

On its web site, the Times digitally blacked out the names of certain 
Iranian agents of the CIA cited in the document.  Times national security 
reporter James Risen wrote this was done "at the urging of  historians and 
Iranian scholars who warned that families of Iranian agents of the CIA may 
face retribution in Iran."

Unfortunately, the digital redaction was clumsily executed by the Times and 
the concealed names could be detected with a minimum of cleverness, as 
discovered by John Young, who runs the estimable Cryptome web site.  Mr. 
Young proceeded to publish the text of the CIA history including the agent 
names that the Times had attempted to conceal.

Insofar as Mr. Young's action puts others at risk, not himself, it seems 
like an elementary moral error.  He has assumed a responsibility that he 
cannot possibly discharge.  Moreover, it is hard to identify any 
countervailing public interest in disclosure of the names.

The more profound responsibility, however, arguably lies with Director of 
Central Intelligence George Tenet and the CIA, who insisted in a lawsuit 
brought by the National Security Archive that no more than one sentence of 
the the 200 page official history could be declassified.  The fundamental 
dishonesty of this claim is now evident from the text published by the Times.

If the CIA had exercised a more discerning classification policy and had 
declassified the bulk of the report, then there would have been no "leak" 
to the New York Times, and no subsequent disclosure of agent 
names.  Instead, through overclassification, DCI Tenet failed in this case 
to fulfill his statutory obligation to protect intelligence sources and 
methods.

The classified CIA history is available on the New York Times web site here:

        http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html

John Young's Cryptome site is here:

        http://cryptome.org

In 1997, the FAS Secrecy & Government Bulletin argued that both the CIA and 
the Government of Iran had a motive to exaggerate the CIA's role in the 
events of 1953, and had in fact done so.  See:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec70.html#coup

(To "subscribe" or "unsubscribe" to these occasional notices from the FAS 
Project on Government Secrecy, send email to [email protected]).

___________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists

http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html

Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 12:22:20 -0400 (EDT)
From: Laleh Khalili 
Sender: [email protected]
To: [email protected]

Dear Mr. Young

Thank you for what you have done with the report.  Truth needs to come out
and those who are concerned with the "lives" of those involved (and this
50 years after - when most of those involved have died of old age or have
been executed by the IRI anyway) seem to me to care about an absrtact
notion called "US interests" more than all those other "lives" that were
lost in the bargain in Iran.

On several levels your work is worth praise: attacking government secrecy,
revealing perils of incompetence in the mad rush of technology, and in
revealing truths that are so controversial, so hot, so important that they
still shape the lives of people in Iran.

Thank you
Laleh

Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 20:06:59 -0400

Date: Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 21:09:52 -0400
To: Edward Wong 
From: John Young 
Subject: cia document

Ed,

When I learned that others were able to access the edited
material it was clear that my discovery was not unique and
was probably preceded by others more technologically
adept. That made it urgent to broadcast the disclosure so 
that the few who knew about it could not take advantage 
of privileged information.

The Times is commended for making the report available.
It is a truly a disturbing document to read and ponder. That
public service should not be diminished by an incidental
aspect, though there may be those who wish to deflect
attention from its immense value by overdramatizing the
names issue.

The report should be widely read -- in full, the names of
all participants in context, none hidden.

Regards,

John
212-873-8700

From: Eric Behr 
Subject: NYT CIA article
To: [email protected]
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 23:33:55 -0500 (CDT)

Have good luck growing up. And if you have this thing called
"conscience" at all, I also wish you good luck dealing with it
when/if you do grow up. Thank you for your time.
--
Eric Behr         | NIU Mathematical Sciences      | (815) 753 6727
[email protected] | http://www.math.niu.edu/~behr/ |  fax: 753 1112

Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini
Colonel Novzari, Commander of 2nd Armored Brigade
Colonel Zand-Karimi, Chief of Staff of 2nd Mountain
     Brigade
Commander Poulad Daj of the Police
Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander of Imperial
     Guards
Lt. Colonel Azamudeh, Reg. CO 1st Mountain Brigade
Colonel Parvaresh, head of the Officers' Club
1st Lieutenant Niahi
Mr. Perron, Swiss subject
General Nadr Batmangelich, retired
Colonel Hadi Karayi, Commander of Imperial Guards
     at Namsar
General Shaybani, retired
Rahim Hirad, Chief of Shah's private secretariat
Soleiman Behbudi, Chief of Shah's household
Lt. Colonel Hamidi, Asst. Director of Police visa section
Colonel Mansurpur, Squadron Leader (cavalry)
Colonel Rowhani, Chief of Staff of 3rd Mountain Brigade
Captain Baladi
1st Lieutenant Naraghi
Captain Shaghaghi
Captain Salimi
1st Lieutenant Eskandari
1st Lieutenant Jafarbey
Mr. Ashtari
Mr. Mohammed Jehandari
1st Lieutenant Rauhani
Dr. Mozaffar Baqai

                    S E C R E T 










                    APPENDIX D


                     Report on

             Military Planning Aspect

                     of TPAJAX

S E C R E T 



Military Aspects  Operation TPAJAX

     In early summer 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of

planning military aspects of TPAJAX.  Several assumptions

first had to be taken into account:

   A.  Operation would be joint operation with SIS.

   B.  Operation would rely heavily upon military

       willingness to fight for Shah.

   C.  Armed forces in Iran under Mossadeq very strongly

       led by pro-Mossadeq officers.

   D.  Operational assets within armed forces controlled

       by SIS o CIA were not at the outset capable of

       executing the military objectives of TPAJAX.

Planning tasks which had to be accomplished:

   E.  Detailed study of the leading military personali-

ties in Iran.

   F.  Detailed study of order of battle of the Iranian

       Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison.

   G.  Detailed military study of communications, supply

       dumps, ammunition depots, command structure Iranian

       armed forces, time and distance factors within

       Tehran and throughout Iran, including road and

       rail nets.

   H.  Detailed study military assets possessed by SIS.

   I.  Operational assets to be developed by CIA; almost

       no military assets were then under CIA control.



                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 

     George Carroll in Washington began a staff study pre-

liminary to drafting a military plan.  Persons who were

particularly helpful in the preparation of this study were

Jerome F. Begert, Willima Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cilsdorf,

Elizabeth E. McNeill, Betty J. Caldwell, and Arthur W.

Dubois.  This group constituted a branch task force.

     Throughout the summer cables were exchanged with the

Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest informa-

tion on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces.  The

Iranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to 

obtain whatever information they could get which might help

accomplish the above tasks.  Information available in G-2

was almost non-existent.  Biographical information on

leading Army figures was extremely scanty.  G-2 did not

possess a tactical map showing the military situation in

the city of Tehran.  It must also be admitted that CIA

too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and

a heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time

when the Tehran Station was already occupied with the

opening phases of TPAJAX.

     The primary difficulty in staff planning at this time

was the fact that neither the field nor headquarters pos-

sessed detailed information on military figures in Iran.

CIA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on


                        2

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 

that type of operational reporting, and we learned as

the days went by how extremely important, indeed vital,

that type of reporting is.

     Throughout the month of June, the branch task force

gradually was supplied information from the field which

made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the

forces within the Tehran garrison.  The field reported

that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infan-

try mountain brigades, and two armored brigades.  In

addition, four other military forces existed:  the Gen-

darmerie, the police, the armed customs guard, and the

forces under the military governor.  It was also learned

that the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi

Riahi, and his staff had been drawn primarily from members

of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party.  It had to be assumed that

the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his

staff were under control of Mossadeq.  I has also to be

assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade

commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's

control.  Those assumptions proved to be correct. SIS

reported that Colonel [Ashrafi, military governor of Tehran

and commanding officer of the Third Mountain Brigade,] could

be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but

for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed


                         3

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


correct.  It was disappointing to learn that Major General

Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under TPAJAX, possessed

almost no military assets.  General Zahedi, therefore,

could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan.

     In the early part of July, the branch task force was

able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran

garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran.  It

appeared at that time that only a very small force could

be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Thrid Mountain Brigade

in Tehran.  Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon

the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and

arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as

well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces

in the city of Tehran.

     Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any mili-

tary assets capable at that time of helping TPAJAX, it was

suggested that Station agent Colonel [Aban Farzanegan] be

given special training.  [Farzanegan] was trained in a safe-

house in Washington with the assistance of instructors from

the training division.  [Farzanegan] had no idea what lay

before him.  He had never previously participated in any

military action, although he had been superbly trained [in]

[logistics in the Command and General Staff School at Ft.]

[Leavenworth. Further, he had been assistant military]


                         4

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


[attache for Iran in Washington for several years, and]

before that had been the [Iranian liaison officer to the

[United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran.]

[He, therefore, had a good grasp of American army methods.]

[He was a Signal Corps officer by profession.]  Because of

the extreme sensitivity of TPAJAX, [Farzanegan] was given

the lie detector test.  In early July, [Farzanegan] was

directed to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old

contacts within the Iranian Army.

     In June, Carroll was assigned TDY to Cyprus to work

with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS.  Carroll

concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and

ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran

military assets.  Headquarters was extremely concerned

because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a firman

dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his Army

officers and men were well organized enough to force

Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey

the firman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military

assets capable of being organized into an effective fight-

ing force and it was feared that the development of new

military assets adn their organization into a fighting

force could not be accomplishe in time.

     SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important


                         5

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


friends among the military, but the only officer among their

friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was

Colonel [Ashrafi.]  SIS agreed that our preliminary military

plan must be based on the assumption that Colonel [Ashrafi]

would cooperate.  Military Planner Carroll doubted whether

one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow

Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be

viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped

upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to

Colonel [Ashrafi.]  From the military point of view the dis-

cussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they

made it clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very

little with which to accomplish it.  It also made it clear

that Carroll and Colonel [Farzanegan] should arrive in Tehran

as soon as possible where the military plan would be neces-

sity have to be completed.

     On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied

the military plan for two days and approved it with little

comment.  They agreed that, if TPAJAX were to succeed, CIA

must start from scratch adn work quickly to find powerful

friends among Iranian Army troop commanders.  In London,

Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers

on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had

been drawn by the branch task force.

     Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists


                         6

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 



for military and civilian persons in Tehran.  These lists

were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq

Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent cor-

rect.  The British approved the arrest lists after their CE

expert and their biographical section studied them.  A

third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very

carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved with-

out addition.  It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians

must have been based upon approximately the same information.

     While these arrest lists were farmed out to SIS ex-

perts Carroll sat down to study the two military plans

with Major Keen and with the British major.  The first plan

was based upon the assumption that [Colonel Ashrafi] was a con-

trolled British agent [and that his Third Mountain Brigade would]

[follow his commands.]  After a detailed examination of the

Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine

gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the

Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had

listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we

had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain

Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest.

     We next turned to an examination of our second military

plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able

to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three

bridgades.  We all agreed that it would be extremely


                         7

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out

of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should

attempt to develop additional forces.  SIS approved this

plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier

who returned them next day without comment.

     During these discussions a cable arrived in London

via Cryprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported

General Zahedi's "military assets."  This message con-

firmed all of our fears.  For some time the Station had

been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his

military assets and to indicate how he hope to use them.

At last General Zahedi reported.  He claimed none of the

five brigades in Tehran.  His military plan assumed that he

might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from

the Department of Army Transport, components from the De-

partment of Police, and components of the Armed Customs

Guard.  He also hoped that Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar] might

be able to bring troops to Tehran from [Kermanshah.]  SIS

asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's

plan.  In that appraisal it was stated that he did not

believe the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq

until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff

Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken;

further, he felt that if TPAJAX were to succeed military


                         8

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


assests must be developed within the five brigades in

Tehran.

     SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take

the following priority:

    1.  Seizure and occupation of designated points.

    2.  Execution of arrest and detention lists.

    3.  Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military

        forces in Tehran.

    4.  Neutralization of the city of Tehran.

    5.  Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in

        Tehran by forces outside of the city.

     These priorities were laid down because it was desired

that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in

order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from

communicating with each other.

     Carroll left London on the first available aricraft

following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July,

and got in touch with [Farzanegan.]

     Sifting through [Farzanegan's] operational contact

reports covering all of his important conversations in

Tehran [after his arrival from the United States], two offi-

cers were noted as being of especial promise.  These were

contact reports of conversations with Major General [Nadr

[Batmangelich] and with Colonel [Hassan Akhavi], both of whom


                         9

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


were old and good friends of [Farzanegan].  These two officers

reflected the fear of the Tudeh party that was becoming gen-

eral after the Tudeh showing of 21 July.  Goiran, Goodwin, and

Carroll agreed that it was imperative that Carroll meet as

soon as possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work

on our military scheme.  Zahedi never did designate a military

secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our own.

     Because of General Zahedi's manifestly weak position

among the military then on active duty, and because it be-

came apparent that it would be necessary for CIA to seize

the initiative and to furnish him with a military plan and

military forces, the development of Colonel [Akhavi] was

stepped up.  [Farzanegan] was directed to determine what

assets Colonel [Akhavi] might be able to lead us to. Colonel

[Akhavi] first offered a "Plan A" which called for a military

coup d'etat without explaining how it was to be accomplished.

Then [Farzanegan] was pressed to persuade Colonel [Akhavi] to be

more realistic, and on 30 July he received from Colonel

[Akhavi] a plan which was more specific but still pitifully

inadequate.  Colonel [Akhavi] said he would execute arrests

and target lists, neutralize military installations and

non-cooperating forces within two hours; this was nonsense.

The most important thing Colonel [Akhavi] reported was that

he was in touch with three young colonels who might possess


                        10

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


important strength within the Tehran garrison.  Colonel

[Akhavi] also told [Farzanegan] that General [Batmangelich]

lacked courage but would stiffen his back should the

Shah appoint him Chief of Staff.  Colonel [Akhavi] did not

mention General Zahedi and did not seem to be in touch

with him.  [Farzanegan] told Colonel Akhavi that he could

put Colonel [Akhavi] in touch with one or two Americans whom

he had met in the United States.

     At this time the Shah also indicated that he did not

have control of important military assets.

     Carroll met [Akhavi] and [Farzanegan] on 2 and 3 August and

begam [sic] staff planning.  Colonel [Akhavi] was full of desire to

do something, but had no idea of how to go about it.  He

said that he had friends who could control the Second and

Third Mountain Brigades but did not trust either Colonel

[Ashrafi], Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade

[and an alleged SIS asset], or Colonel Momtaz, Commanding

Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade.  Colonel [Akhavi]

reported that General [Batmangelich] had told him the day

before that if the Shah acted he was ready to perform any

service whatsoever and to die for the Shah if necessary.

After these early meetings with Colonel [Akhavi], it became

apparent that he, himself, was not in a position to command

anything and was only hoping that he might persuade his


                        11

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


friends to do so.

     Carroll then met directly with Colonel [Akhavi] and

his friend.  The latter turned out to be Colonel [Zand-Karimi],

[Colonel Komtaz's deputy].  Colonel [Zand-Karimi] reported a

long list of assets within the Tehran garrison, principally

among deputy commanders of brigades and regimental com-

manders.  On 6, 7, and 8 August, Colonels [Akhavi, Zand-

Karimi, Farzanegan], and Mr. Carroll carried on staff plan-

ning based upon the units commanded by friends whom [Zand-

Karimi] claimed.  Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that his primary

friends were [Colonel Hamidi], of the Tehran police; [Colonel]

[Ordubadi], of the Tehran Gendarmerie District; and [Colonel]

[Mansurpur, Commanding Officer Iranian Cavalry].  He felt

certain that ultimate victory would be ours through these

friends, and through his friends who were regimental and

battalion commanders, among these were important unit

commanders in the Tehran garrison: [Colonel Rohani, Deputy]

[Commander of the Third Mountain Brigade; Lt. Colonel Khosro-]

[Panah, Commanding Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade]

[Infantry Regiment; Lt. Colonel Yusefi, who was soon to be

named Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade's

Infantry Regiment.]  Through these officers Colonel [Zand-

[Karimi] was in touch with every infantry battalion commander

in Tehran and with most of the company commanders; however,


                        12

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


those officers had not been formed into an organization

and were not ready to overthrow Chief of Staff General

Riahi's firm control of the Terhran garrison which he ex-

ercized through the Brigade Commanders in Tehran.  For

instance, if we were to succeed we must arrest Colonel

Sharokh, Commanding Officer First Armored Brigade; Colonel

Parsa, Commanding Officer First Mountain Brigade; and

probably Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding

Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade.  Colonel Novzari,

Commanding Officer of the Second Armore Brigade would

probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his

deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested.

     It therefore became clear from the military point of

view that success might depend upon whether or not General

Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested

his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest

upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while

attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning

team.

     It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable

of carrying our operations in the event our first platoon

of young officers was arrested.  Carroll therefore worked

for two nights with Colonels [Farzanegan and Zand-Karimi]


                        13

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


devising a system which would work in the event our first

team was arrested.  The danger signal we adopted to alert

battalion and company commanders to take independent action

was the arrest of Colonel [Zand-Karimi] and of his closest

friends.  The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the

station would not be in a position to contact battalion and

company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel

[Zand-Karimi] to do the job.  While discussing this subject,

Colonel [Zand=Karimi] stated that he would be able to contact

lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the

Shah's firman.

     The hesitation of the Shah in signing the firman worked

to our advantage for it gave us several more important days

in which to discuss with Colonel [Zand-Karimi] the development

of our final staff plans which was based upon the use of the

units which his friends commanded.  This problem was compli-

cated by the fact that Colonel [Akhavi] became violently ill

and was later forced to retire to his bed.  As the climax

approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable

that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel

[Akhavi's] illness.  Colonel [Akhavi] did remain on his feet

long enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August in an interview

which later proved vital to the success of the military phase 

of TPAJAX.  Until Colonel [Akhavi] saw the Shah, he was not


                        14

                    S E C R E T 

S E C R E T 


certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act

without the Shah's approval.  However, after talking with

the Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] was able to tell Colonel [Zand-

Karimi] that the Shah did desire military support in the

event he should decide to sign the firman.

     Colonel [Akhavi] was asked by the Shah whether or not

the Army would back a firman dismissing Mossadeq.  Colonel

[Akhavi] told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll

and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one

that assured victory if it were carried out properly.  The

Shah then asked [Akhavi] for the names of the officers who

would cooperate, and Colonel [Akhavi] reported the same names

which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah

Rashidian.  He asked [Akhavi] to meet General Zahedi.

     In reporting the substance of his audience with the

Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] asked the station if the United States

would support General Zahedi.  He was told that it would.

Colonel [Zand-Karimi] also accepted General Zahedi.  Both

officers stated that they had not been in touch with General

Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good

leader.

     During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff plan-

ning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders

within the Tehran garrison.  Colonel [Akhavi] met General


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Zahedi who agreed that General [Batmangelich] might be chief

of staff.  General [Batmangelich] expressed the desire to

meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan [in clear],

Colonel [Akhavi], and Colonel [Zand-Karimi].  This meeting

was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete

enough for General [Batmangelich] to act upon it.

     On 11 August Zahedi asked [Akhavi] to have [Farzanegan]

come to see him.  General Zahedi and [Farzanegan] talked

for three hours.  [Farzanegan] reported that General Zahedi

was extremely appreciative of American assistance and

asked [Farzanegan] to act as liaison officer between him-

self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked

him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau

which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week.

     On 12 August Farzanegan [in clear] took General [Batmangelich] to

see Zahedi, and General [Bamangelich] pledged General Zahedi

all assistance.  [Farzanegan] also took Colonel [Zand-Karmini]

to see Zahedi and the latter reported to General Zahedi

progress of military staff planning.  In retrospect it

would appear that under more favorable conditions we should

have spen more time going over the staff plan with Zahedi

and General [Bamangelich], for it was at this moment that

the military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zahedi's hands,

although Zahedi did not know any of the young officers


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involved and General [Batmangelich] knew only a few of them.

     During the afternoon of 15 August, Carroll met with

General [Batmangelich] and the Military Secretariat composed

of [Farzanegan,] Colonel [Akhavi,] and Colonel [Zand-Karimi].

The firmans were expected momentarily and much of the

conversation revolved around the question of how long it

would take Colonel [Zand-Karimi] to contact our friendly

forty line commanders.  After a long discussion everyone

agreed action should commence within 48 hours of the re-

ceipt of the firmans.  It was also agreed that Colonel

[Namiri, Commanding Officer of the Imperial Guard], would

deliver the firmans to Mossadeq after he had sent the

station a radio set attuned to Colonel [Zand-Karimi's]

command net.

     Colonel [Nasiri] flew to Ramsar with the unsigned

firmans on 13 August.
















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